This blog post is written by Devin Frank. Devin was called to the Bar of England and Wales in 2017 through The Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. He is currently a PhD candidate and an associate tutor of Tort and Criminal Law at Birkbeck School of Law and an Editor-at-Large of the Birkbeck Law Review. The post is written in a personal capacity and all views expressed are the author's own.

Under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, British police and border officials are allocated sweeping powers that allow them to stop, search and hold individuals at airports, ports and international rail stations with or without suspicion. The purpose of granting such extraordinary powers is to ‘determine’ if someone is concerned with the preparation, instigation and commission of terrorism (as vague as that may be). The danger that arises is that officials may abuse these powers: stopping people for arbitrary reasons or gathering information to further the pursuit of other politically motivated goals, or that the police, in exercising their powers, will aggravate and marginalise already disenfranchised communities, inadvertently making the United Kingdom a less safe place to live. One troubling development is that under Schedule 7, the police are empowered to demand passwords to phones, laptops and other electronic devices. Refusal to share passwords can lead to an arrest. Police and border officials can then access private documents that relate to the traveller, or private information of others that the traveller is holding on trust.
 
In a one hour interview, Muhammad Rabbani, the international Director of the NGO Cage, discussed both the validity of these laws and how they are currently being abused. The focus of the discussion was Rabbani’s own experience under Schedule 7. Not only has he been stopped more than 20 times, but last year he was stopped, arrested and later convicted for refusing to handover his passwords. As he explained, he was happy to cooperate and answer any questions that related to himself. However, because Rabbani is trusted to protect confidential information, some of which relates to victims of torture and may be used in lawsuits against Western governments, it is essential that he keep this information confidential.
 
The interview began with Rabbani explaining his role in Cage, and what Cage does for the community. From the outset, it was clear that Rabbani was primarily concerned with defending the rule of law. As he explained, Cage helps to protect the rule of law by shining a spotlight on its violation. This often includes advocating on behalf of vulnerable people who have found themselves on the wrong side of state violence. Through Cage, survivors of state torture can be put in touch with lawyers and find support networks. Victims of state violence can also be given a voice by being assisted in telling their story in a way that is truthful, accurate and honest. As Rabbani explained, Cage works as an advocacy group that intervenes on behalf of people and also influences the general conversation around terrorism, violence and how society interprets violent acts to encourage conversations that move beyond the politics of fear and scaremongering. 
 
Shining a spotlight on the violation of the rule of law may also explain why UK border officials were intent on targeting Rabbani. Cage recently revealed that Rabbani was protecting Ali al-Marri, a man who is now accusing the US Government of torture and other cruel and inhumane treatment. Cage has also named six US agents who the organisation alleges were implicated in torturing al-Marri, and recently published 35,000 documents which they say support this claim. When stopped at Heathrow Airport, if Rabbani had given the officials his passwords, they would have had advance access to this material (it is common knowledge that British officials share information with US allies).
 
The underlying objective behind Schedule 7 is to allow officials to prevent the preparation, instigation and commission of terrorism. However, under Schedule 7, Rabbani and many others are stopped for reasons unrelated to any reasonable suspicion that they will engage in violent acts. Addressing this issue, Rabbani noted that of the more than 20 occasions he has been stopped, he is always asked the same questions and after much hassle, allowed to enter the UK. The issue is, if the authorities generally believed that he was a threat, they should take action. As they never do take any meaningful action, the logical conclusion is that he is not a threat. This begs the question, why is Rabbani continually stopped, detained and questioned by UK border officials and terrorism police?
 
On the occasion that Rabbani refused to disclose his passwords, the authorities did take action. They arrested him and later secured a conviction in a magistrates’ court. However, the very fact that Rabbani’s trial took place in a magistrates’ court is reason to pause. The magistrates’ court is a venue that typically deals with the most minor of offences. The most typical offence that is prosecuted in a magistrates’ court is a driving offence. Crimes that society has deemed to be of the utmost seriousness - such as rape and murder - can only be tried in the Crown Court. As offences that are destined for the magistrates’ court are deemed to be the most minor of offences, magistrates have limited sentencing powers and are not bound by the same rules of evidence that exist in the Crown Court. The irony is that the Government is effectively saying: due to the threat of terrorism, we need extraordinary powers to protect the public. However, the people who are to be targeted by these powers should receive a trial in a court that only deals with the most minor of offences (magistrates’ sentencing powers are limited to a maximum sentence of six months in prison). What should be demanded from the Government is consistency. If we are indeed under siege and the extraordinary powers granted under Schedule 7 are necessary, then, when people are arrested, they should be tried by jury in the Crown Court.

​While this commentary is taking issue with the way in which the Government is exercising its power under Schedule 7, on 3 May 2018, Rabbani was in the High Court arguing a different point. Challenging his conviction for refusing to provide the passwords to his devices at a Schedule 7 stop, he argued that first, the Prosecution should be compelled to adduce evidence as to the reason for stopping him; secondly, Schedule 7 lacks sufficient safeguards to protect confidential and special procedure material; and thirdly, that no offence arises from refusing to give passwords so as to protect confidential material. Challenging the legality of Schedule 7, Rabbani’s lawyer, Henry Blaxland QC, argued that “Schedule 7 powers are coercive and intrusive and violate article 8 and 10 of an individual’s human rights.” Lord Justice Irwin and Mr Justice Foskett reserved their judgment.
 
As a concluding point, Rabbani made an important observation. He argued that Schedule 7 may have undesirable consequences for public safety, such that the police are actually making the UK a less safe place to live. Discussing his own experiences of being detained, Rabbani noted that he has a level of maturity that allows for him to cope with and process the ordeal. But what about young people whose first contact with terrorism police is whilst being arbitrarily detained in an airport? As Rabbani said:
 
“But what you guys have to understand is that if I were an eighteen year old and this is my first contact with authority and this is the way you treat me, how is that productive? How is that actually serving the purpose of avoiding or stopping terrorism? You are alienating people, you are aggravating them. You are actually creating enemies. You are creating a generation of disaffected young men, typically, you know. So, anyway, those are some of the structural problems.”
 
The overriding argument made by Rabbani is that Schedule 7 is an unjust law that is not having the desired effect – the prevention, preparation, instigation and commission of terrorism. Indeed, while the police and border officials are constantly exercising their Schedule 7 powers - arbitrarily stopping, questing and detaining people - it is rarely the case that they arrest and convict anyone. The police are nevertheless afforded the opportunity to profile and collect data on innocent people. One of the many benefits of living in a democracy is that citizens can challenge their government. Cage does just this - it challenges the UK Government on its use of oppressive laws through advocacy and court challenges.

The full interview with Muhammad Rabbani, conducted by Devin Frank, Amanda Flanaghan and James Godfrey, will be published in a future issue of the Birkbeck Law Review.

Nasredeen Abdulbari, LLB, LLM (Khartoum University, Sudan); LLM (Harvard University); is a Doctor of Juridical Science candidate at Georgetown University and former lecturer on law, University of Khartoum.  

This is the final instalment of a two-part interview on the background to his interest and research in women and South Sudanese citizenship law.

BBKLR: South Sudan often makes the news in the UK, but rarely is that news positive. However, your article paints South Sudan as progressive – at least in the realm of women’s citizenship. Would you say this progressive nature is reflected in other legal areas as well?

NA: I would say this is true of some other legal areas of South Sudanese laws that I am familiar with such as constitutional law and passport and immigration law, while it is not of some others—I cannot speak to all the other legal areas, as there of course are many laws in South Sudan.

The Passport and Immigration Act of 2011, which I had the honour of reading when it was a draft is now as progressive as the nationality law. The Transitional Constitution of 2011 does clearly reflect a variety of progressive aspects of any modern constitution in that it does not adopt a single identity for the new nation—the National Constitutional Review Commission looked into the constitutional experiences of some states such as South Africa and probably India.

Modern state constitutions are based on citizenship, not on ethnic, religious, or cultural identities, although they contain provisions whose objective is to organize and protect these identities. In addition, the Transitional Constitution, respecting multiculturalism, adopts in Article 2(1) all the indigenous languages of South Sudan as national languages.

This recognition and adoption would certainly advance and elevate the status of these languages and contribute to promoting and developing them in the end. The adoption in Article 6(2) of the English language (a neutral language in the context of South Sudan) as the official language and the of language instruction at all levels of education, prevents South Sudan from adopting a language that would culturally put one ethnic group or culture in an advantageous position.

The new nation (like all linguistically and culturally diverse nations) had three options in this regard: the adoption of all vernacular languages as official languages and the languages of instruction, the adoption of the language of the largest ethnic group (i.e. the Dinka language), or the adoption of an ethnically or culturally neutral language as the official language.  It opted for the third option.

However, as we very well know, the adoption of progressive or good laws, although a huge step forward, does not alone guarantee stability, harmony, and progressiveness of a nation and its legal and political systems. It is good and important to have progressive laws on the books—but equally important is to ensure that they are respected and implemented. Application of such laws by citizens who are committed to constitutionalism, justice, equality, impartiality, and fighting corruption and nepotism through strong governance institutions is a sine qua none of peace, stability, and advancement. South Sudan is unfortunately tragically missing such institutions. Unless this major challenge and the politicization of ethnicity are properly addressed, South Sudan (and arguably Sudan) will continue to be a source of negative news. I hope this will not continue to be the case.
 
In addition to this discrepancy between law in theory and law in practice, South Sudan has laws that contain some unprogressive provisions. A clear example in this respect is the existence of capital punishment in the Penal Code of 2008 (Section 64 on treason, for example), so South Sudan has not been progressive on the death penalty.

BBKLR: The BBC and other Western journalists describe legal institutions in South Sudan as ‘weak’. Is this your experience too?

NA: In fact, I have not had direct practical experience with South Sudanese legal institutions. However, the experiences of many of my South Sudanese friends or colleagues who lived and worked in South Sudan demonstrate that legal institutions are weak in South Sudan.

These institutions are nascent and the government of South Sudan has not had the time, the willingness, the expertise, and often financial resources to strengthen them since the nation gained independence in 2011.

The country has had a very rocky start and experienced major ongoing conflicts in its first five years. This has unsurprisingly led to the deterioration of the fledgling legal institutions in the country.

The breakout of the civil war in December 2013 and ensuing brutality of civilians and loss of confidence in the government has prevented donors and the operations of several international organizations, which were initially enthusiastic and committed to assist the government of South Sudan to build and strengthen its institutions. 

BBKLR: Do you think that the recent civil war will affect the citizenship laws in South Sudan or is there general consensus around these?

NA: Fortunately, I do not think the recent civil war and ongoing conflict will ultimately affect the citizenship law in South Sudan. The citizenship law was adopted when the two parties (headed by the currently competing President Salva Kiir and former Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar) were in relative agreement.

At the recent peace negotiations, neither of the two warring parties demanded that the citizenship law be amended to give women fewer rights. It is my hope that this will remain the case. South Sudan continues to experience a very dynamic political and security situation.

The composition of the National Constitutional Review Commission and the future of the permanent Constitution are under consideration, which may affect the direction of some other progressive laws.

Despite the current uncertainty regarding some progressive laws, I remain optimistic in terms of the progressive aspects of the citizenship law. 

BBKLR: Thanks very much for your time. We've really enjoyed learning more about this new and fascinating area.

Nasredeen Abdulbari, LLB, LLM (Khartoum University, Sudan); LLM (Harvard University); is a Doctor of Juridical Science candidate at Georgetown University and former lecturer on law, University of Khartoum.  

This is the first of a two-part interview on the background to his interest and research in women and South Sudanese citizenship law.

BBKLR:  Hi Nasredeen, thanks for talking to us about your paper, 'Women and Citizenship in
Sudan and South Sudan: A Comparative Analysis'. It caught the eye of the Birkbeck Law Review Editorial Board right away.
 
As one of the world’s newest countries, one would expect there to be a great deal of interest in how legislation develops. Thank you for bringing this very interesting subject to light.
 
How did you come to study this topic?

NA: I came to study this topic of women and citizenship as part of my broader research and studies on citizenship (in general), inclusion, and diversity (be it ethnic, gender, cultural, or religious). 

My relationship with citizenship law and policies first started when I took a course on United States immigration law and policy during my master of laws studies in the United States. My attention was drawn to this particular women and citizenship issue in late 2009 early 2010, when I was, in fact, doing research on citizenship laws in Sudan and post-secession problems—it became clear back then that South Sudan was going to secede from Sudan. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the citizenship laws of Sudan and the future citizenship law of South Sudan to predict the possible scenarios, as far as South Sudanese residing in the North (i.e. Sudan) and North Sudanese residing in the South were concerned. 

The ultimate objective of my research was to ensure that the international human rights of ordinary citizens would not be violated as a result of what was an inevitable breakup between Sudan and South Sudan. After completing my initial research and examination of the Sudan Nationality Act of 1994 (as amended in 2005) and the New Sudan Act of 2003, I came away with a conclusion that the two laws were discriminating on the basis of gender and race. As I was writing generally about post-secession problems, focusing specifically and comprehensively on gender discrimination was beyond the scope of my research.

My thoughts on the question of discrimination against women in citizenship granting and deprivation further developed when I was invited by a local non-governmental organization in Khartoum, Sudan, to speak about citizenship and protection of internally displaced women. It was at this point that I studied the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention). It was during this stage, too, that I studied the relevant international conventions that were specifically adopted to address the citizenship problems of women who get married or divorced and those of women whose husbands’ citizenship changes during their marriage (if they are married to an alien man). These conventions aim at protecting women against losing their citizenship as a result of getting married, divorced, or their husband’s change of nationality while they are still married.

I have utilized the research that I conducted and the ideas that I developed during these two different occasions as well as my public international law and human rights background to write this article. The article now, I hope, comprehensively tackles the different dimensions of the question of women and citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan in comparison to the experiences of some other African nations and international law principles and rules.

BBKLR: Sudan and South Sudan have very different attitudes to women and citizenship under the law. Why do you think this has come about?

NA: Sudan and South Sudan are two different nations in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, and history, and have always been so. Culturally speaking, Sudan is, in general, a mixture of indigenous African and Arab cultures—many people moved from West Africa, North Africa, and the Arab Peninsula into Sudan over different periods of time. Arab and Muslim immigrants who immigrated to Sudan as merchants or preachers brought the Arabic and Islamic culture into the country. Thereby, Islam became the dominant religion in the North, and Sharia has been applied since 1983. South Sudan has been dominantly Christian (about 57%) with the existence of a small Muslim population.

Immigrants from the other parts of Africa came with their own cultures, as well. As for Sudan, the mixture of these various cultures and ethnicities does not, however, negate the fact that there are tribes or ethnicities, in some parts of Sudan that, generally speaking, still maintain their distinct “African” or Arab cultures. Ethnically, Sudan has a mixed Arab and black African population, although the vast majority is still ethnically black African. In terms of religion, Sudan is dominantly Muslim with a minority Christian population and indigenous African religions and belief systems in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan).

Historically, because of geographic, linguistic, and religious ties, the North has been more connected to Egypt and the Middle East, while South Sudan has been increasingly more connected to East Africa. In fact, the British, in the last years of their colonialization of Sudan, considered making South Sudan part of East Africa.

Overall, Sudan and South Sudan, when still united as one country, had disharmonious and usually tense relations, which in 1955 manifested in what was the beginning of the longest African civil war creating further social and cultural disconnections between them.

To address the problem of such relations, the British adopted a policy known as the Southern Policy that prevented Northern merchants from entering into the southern region of Sudan (now South Sudan). That policy arguably helped South Sudanese maintain their languages and cultures.

This brief history illustrates to a wide extent the different cultural and therefore legal attitudes in Sudan and South Sudan towards women. Attitudes of men towards women and of women towards men are normally shaped by religion, culture, and history. Laws, when propagated and applied by the state for a long time—as Sharia has been in Sudan—also contribute to shaping the attitudes of people.

Therefore, differences of history, culture, and religion between the two nations illustrate the difference of attitudes towards women. Given that legislation is in many ways a reflection of cultural and historical notions, the citizenship laws of the two nations are understandably different when it comes to women.

That is why I argue in my article that religious and cultural notions and practices are responsible for the existence of discrimination. 

Part 2 of this article will follow shortly.

We are very pleased to announce that Volume 3 Issue 2 of the Birkbeck Law Review is now available. Find it at bbklr.org/publications.

This issue celebrates some of the wonderful contributions made to our second annual conference. On 13 and 14 November 2015, a diverse cohort of academics and legal practitioners from around the world gathered at Birkbeck, University of London, to present their research and to debate on the theme of Migration, Borders and Violence. While engaging and dynamic, it was also an emotionally sobering and, at times, harrowing event, as so many of the speakers recounted stories of immense human suffering. All too often, the message was of the law’s complicity in the tragedies that befall migrants.

This issue begins with Professor Jill E Family, of Widener University Commonwealth Law School. We also feature articles by Simon Behrman (Lecturer in Law at the University of East Anglia), Sheona York (reader in Law at the University of Kent and a practising solicitor at the Kent Law Clinic), Michael Garcia Bochenek (Attorney JD, senior counsel on children’s rights at Human Rights Watch), Kirstine Nordentoft Mose and Vera Wriedt, Mariska Jung, Gabriel Gualano de Godoy, and Priya Solanki (1 Pump Court Chambers, London).

— The Birkbeck Law Review Editorial Board

We are pleased to announce that on the 16th July the Birkbeck Law Review was cited in the UK Supreme Court ruling on FHR European Ventures LLP and others  v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45.

This is a proud moment for the team at the BBKLR, and demonstrates our commitment to providing a  platform for quality, thought-provoking articles that add to the academic debate. 

The article was written by Sir Terence Etherton and can be read directly on our website at bbklr.org/2-1-4.

The Supreme Court's ruling can be found on their website. The BBKLR is cited in paragraph 29 of Lord Neuberger's judgment, on page 12:
supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2013_0049_Judgment.pdf

On behalf of the team at the BBKLR: thank you to everyone who continues to support our project and we look forward to continuing our success in the future.

We are very pleased to announce that Volume 2 Issue 1 of the Birkbeck Law Review is now available. Find it at bbklr.org/publications.

We open this issue with an interview with Dr Kirsten Campbell of Goldsmiths, University of London. We explore the application of Bruno Latour’s concept of legal construction of ‘the social’ to the understanding of post-conflict justice mechanisms. Dr Campbell explains how Latour’s theory relates to her research work focusing on the operation of international criminal law (in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and transitional justice mechanisms in Bosnia and elsewhere.

The leading article ‘Asylum and the Common: Mediations between Foucault, Agamben and Esposito’ by Serene John-Richards offers an innovative and critical approach to the discussion about the rights of asylum seekers in the UK. Recalling Foucault’s notions of state racism and hierarchisation, she argues that both play a significant role in enabling destitution of asylum seekers. She then discusses Agamben’s concepts ofhomo sacer and bare life which she uses to show the similarities between the legal situation of asylum seekers in the UK and their de facto destitution. Finally, she examines Esposito’s paradigm of immunisation to argue that asylum seekers are seen as to represent a threat to the preservation of individual identity.

With ‘A Critique of Enlightened Shareholder Value: Revisiting the Shareholder Primacy Theory’, Collins C Ajibo takes a new look at the meaning of section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. He examines the theoretical debates surrounding the statutory re-conceptualization of the traditional common law shareholders primacy into ‘enlightened shareholders value’ and addresses the practical considerations on how this section operates and how it is enforced by the courts. He argues that the biggest weakness of section 172 lies in its enforcement constraints and advocates for the courts to adopt a teleological interpretative approach to plug the loophole in stakeholder protection.         

We are very pleased to include an article by our patron, Sir Terence Etherton, Chancellor of the High Court, in which he discusses the scope of proprietary relief for breach of fiduciary duty. His analysis, which is based on the approaches of the common law and equity to proprietary relief, examines the significance of the departure from the coherent equitable principles of AG of Hong Kong v Reid in the recent decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Limited v Versailles Trade Finance Limited. Sir Terence argues that Sinclair introduces problematic principles in relation to opportunity gains obtained by fiduciaries in breach of their fiduciary duties and maintains that, if there is to be any departure from Reid, there must be a sound basis for doing so and one which will leave the law both coherent and internally consistent.

In ‘The Concept of Citizenship: Multicultural Challenges and Latin American Constitutional Democracy’, Helga Maria Lell considers notions of citizenship in Latin American multicultural societies. She argues that certain constitutional statements of equality may operate at only a rhetorical level and that, although certain rights are formally granted to every citizen, it is often the case that certain members of society are not able to exercise these rights. The conclusion she draws, therefore, is that while legal and political rights are formally granted to minority groups, administrative and social conditions make such rights unattainable to the very groups that they were designed to help.

Inspired by his personal accounts of a visit to the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Asad Rizvi in the article ‘The Dislocated Children of Violence and Memory: Ghostly Apparitions of Injustice in the Legal, Literary, Cultural and Social’, argues that an excessive degree of empirical violence produces ‘ghosts’ which occupy socio-cultural institutions and remain present in national consciousness. His hypothesis is illustrated by the analysis of the work of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and other transitional justice institutions. Despite the attempts to deal with the past, he argues, ghosts linger in the psyche of the nation and possess its instruments such as law, literature, language and the arts.                    

In ‘Brazil’s “New Middle Class” and the Effectiveness of Social Rights through Consumption: A Dialectic of Inclusion and Exclusion’ Enzo Bello, Renata Piroli Mascarello and Rene José Keller examine how consumption becomes the means for the realization of social rights and how at the same time it contributes to the fortification of citizenship and social inclusion. Consumption in Brazil, they argue, is seen as a way of gaining a greater autonomy and it reflects the creation of the ‘new middle class’. Coming from the materialist dialectic approach the article identifies the points of conflict and convergence between the social façade (consumer) and the political façade (citizenship) of the person. 

This issue also includes an expanded features section which, in addition to the opening interview, features two book reviews. The first one, by Dr Jose Bellido, looks at Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law edited by Helena R Howe and Jonathan Griffiths. The second, by Devin Frank, evaluates Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn edited by Mireille Hildebrant and Katha Vries.


— The Birkbeck Law Review Editorial Board

The Birkbeck Law Review (BBKLR) is pleased to announce a call for submission of abstracts for the upcoming conference on Privacy and Surveillance, to be held on the 31st of October and the 1st of November 2014.

Submissions are welcome from legal practitioners, policy makers, students, academics, and any individuals who are interested in the topic of surveillance and privacy and willing to present their paper at the main central London campus of Birkbeck, University of London. 

Prior to potential presenters to submitting their full paper, we ask interested individuals to send an abstract of approximately 250-300 words. Abstracts can be submitted using the online submissions system. The deadline for abstracts to be received is the 2nd June 2014, and successful applicants will be notified by the 16th June 2014.

If the abstracts are approved by the Editorial Board, the panelist will be asked to submit a maximum 5000-word paper that adheres to the BBKLR’s submission guidelines. Further details on the specific topics we are looking for can be found at www.bbklr.org/submissions.

These papers will be published in a special edition of Volume 2 Issue 2 of the Birkbeck Law Review.

The use of sentences within England and Wales is a topic that always divides the opinion of the public. However, over the last few years, there has been a fresh argument, made that those who have a life sentence without the chance of parole is in breach of their human rights. Back in 2012 convicted murderer Jeremy Bamber, along with two other prisoners, made the first steps in challenging against their sentences by appealing to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Their primary argument being that the sentence is in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

At the end of last month, it was found that the Grand Chamber, the highest court of the ECtHR, held that there is a breach of Article 3. This was held because there is no review process, for those given life without parole sentences. In addition, although in principle there is no issue with these sentences, on a practical level there should be a review process after twenty five years. This decision has caused controversy for both politicians and the judiciary. Furthermore, there has been criticism from victims of crime and members of the public who believe that prisoners should not be entitled to rights. It is because of this ruling that the Court of Appeal is now set to hear three new appeals contesting this type of sentence.

It is important to remember, that although the appeal on human rights grounds has been successful this does not stop judges giving life without parole sentences at the present time. What makes this a hot topic of debate is the upcoming sentence of the murderers of Fusilier Lee Rigby. Mr Justice Sweeny, who presided over the murder trial, has delayed sentencing until the appeal(s) for this type of sentence have been ruled upon.

In summary, whatever the outcome for the use of life without parole sentences the debate on whether life should mean life will continue to divide everyone in society rather than just those in the legal and political world.

For more information on this topic please use the following links:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20520372

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25450555

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25870832

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23245254